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THE RIGHTS OF THE






It is self-evident that the commonweal of the world is contingent
upon the welfare of its children. Not evident, however, are the ways and
means to maximize child development and the human potential for good-
ness. Those interested in human rights must earnestly and continuously
strive for this kind of knowledge, a quest which will occupy the minds and
lives of philosophers-and lawyers.
The unique rights of children have been acclaimed in several interna-
tional instruments.' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,2 for ex-
ample, recognizes the importance to human society of the "special care
and assistance to which children are entitled."3 The Declaration of the
Rights of the Child' is an even more sweeping recognition of children's
rights. This instrument proclaims ten principles in appreciation of a
child's peculiar needs, which are products of "his physical and mental
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law; B.A., Rosary College, 1969;
M.A., University of Illinois, 1974; J.D., DePaul University, 1975; LL.M., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1976.
1 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2542, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 49, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969)
(Arts. 11 & 22) [hereinafter cited as Universal Declaration of Human Rights]; G.A. Res.
2263, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 35, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967); G.A. Res. 2200(A), 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); G.A. Res. 2037, 20 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 14) 40, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); G.A. Res. 1386, 14 U.N.GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959), [hereinafter cited as Rights of the Child]; G.A. Res. 317, U.N.
Doc. A/1251 at 33 (1949); G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1.
Id. at Art. 11, § (b).
Rights of the Child, supra note 1.
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immaturity."' According to this Declaration, which in and of itself has no
force of law,' the child is entitled to the following: freedom from discrimi-
nation,7 developmental opportunities,8 a name and a nationality," health
care, 0 education," housing,"2 affection, 3 recreation, 4 freedom from abuse
Id. at Preamble, col. 1.
A Declaration by the United Nations General Assembly is not a treaty. See 19 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 751 (1948). A Declaration may, however, assume the authority of custom and thus be
considered as law by the International Court of Justice. See Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of
International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945), T.S. No. 993, 25.
7Principle 1
The child shall enjoy all the rights set forth in this Declaration. Every child, without
any exception whatsoever, shall be entitled to these rights, without distinction or dis-
crimination on account of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other...
status, whether of himself or of his family.
Rights of the Child, supra note 1, at 19.
Principle 2
The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facili-
ties, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, mor-
ally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of
freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of
the child shall be the paramount consideration.
Id. at 20.
9 Principle 3
The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality.
Id.
Principle 4
The child shall enjoy the benefits of social security. He shall be entitled to grow and
develop in health; to this end, special care and protection shall be provided both to
him and to his mother, including adequate pre-natal and post-natal care. The child
shall have the right to adequate nutrition, housing, recreation and medical services.
Principle 5
The child who is physically, mentally or socially handicapped shall be given the
special treatment, education and care required by his particular condition.
Id.
,I Principle 7
The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at
least in the elementary stages. He shall be given an education which will promote his
general culture, and enable him, on a basis of equal opportunity, to develop his abili-
ties, his individual judgment, and his sense of moral and social responsibility, and to
become a useful member of society.
The best interests of the child shall be the guiding principle of those responsible for
his education and guidance; that responsibility lies in the first place with his parents.
The child shall have full opportunity for play and recreation, which should be di-
rected to the same purposes as education; society and the public authorities shall
endeavour to promote the enjoyment of this right.
Id.
12 Supra note 10.
'3 Principle 6
The child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, needs love
and understanding. He shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the
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and neglect, 5 and exposure to an atmosphere of tolerance and friend-
ship.
The Declaration of the Rights of the Child calls upon national gov-
ernments to implement legislatively the ten principles. 7 Each national
government, with its own unique socio-economic system, should inter-
pret these principles through their own culture. The specific content and
force of these principles are effectuated through a legislature employing
the dominant cultural values of that nation.
CULTURAL PLURALISM AND FUNDAMENTAL VALUES
A country's legal system and its dominant legal principles both incor-
porate and expose the basic cultural postulates of a society. 9 Certain dif-
ferences in legal systems will flow from differences in basic concepts and
values. A comparative view of family law, for instance, demonstrates that
responsibility of his parents, and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of
moral and material security; a child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional
circumstances, be separated from his mother. Society and the public authorities shall
have the duty to extend particular care to children without a family and to those
without adequate means of support. Payments of State and other assistance towards
the maintenance of children in large families is desirable.
Rights of the Child, supra note 1, at 20.
1' Supra notes 10 and 11.
S5 Principle 8
The child shall in all circumstances be among the first to receive protection and
relief.
Principle 9
The child shall be protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation. He
shall not be the subject of traffic, in any form.
The child shall not be admitted to employment before an appropriate minimum age;
he shall in no case be caused or permitted to engage in any occupation or employment
which would prejudice his health or education, or interfere with his physical, mental
or moral development.
Rights of the Child, supra note 1, at 20.
16 Principle 10
The child shall be protected from practices which may foster racial, religious and
any other form of discrimination. He shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding,
tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace and universal brotherhood, and in full
consciousness that his energy and talents should be devoted to the service of his fellow
men.
Id.
'7 Id. at Preamble.
See generally, LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (L. Nader ed. 1972); 67 AMERICAN ANTHROPOL-
OGIST (Special Publication, THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAW (L. Nader ed. 1965)); S. F. MOORE,
LAW AS PROCESS (1978).
" See generally, E. A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL
DYNAMICS (1954); see also. Hoebel, Fundamental Cultural Postulates and Judicial Lawmak-
ing in Pakistan, 67 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 43 (1965).
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laws flow from varying societal concepts of "family."" Family organiza-
tion is a universal grouping of human society."' The precise definition of
"family," however, differs from culture to culture. Ask an American what
is meant by "family," and you will be told that it consists of the mother,
the father, and their children.22 The American concept of family is the
nuclear family of procreation, 3 and American laws concerning marriage,2'
adoption, 5 inheritance," and support of dependents 7 flow from this un-
derstanding of family.
The American concept of a nuclear family is by no means the univer-
sal mode for dealing with the reproductive, economic, sexual, and educa-
tional functions commonly served by the family unit. 8 As reported by
ethnographers, the forms of family seem to exhaust the logical possibili-
ties. 9 The Nuer had a legally recognizable institution of woman-to-woman
2' See generally, KINSHIP AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (P. Bohannan & J. Middleton eds. 1968);
MARRIAGE, FAMILY AND RESIDENCE (P. Bohannan & J. Middleton eds. 1966); G.P. MURDOCK,
SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1960).
2 See note 20 supra.
D. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT (1968); D. SCHNEIDER & R. SMITH,
CLASS DIFFERENCES AND SEX ROLES IN AMERICAN KINSHIP AND FAMILY STRUCTURE (1973). See
also B. FARBER, KINSHIP AND CLASS: A MIDWESTERN STUDY (1971).
The nuclear family of procreation is to be distinguished from the nuclear family of orien-
tation, which consists of the individual and his or her siblings and parents. The family of
orientation is the nuclear family into which one is born, while the family of procreation is
the nuclear family that one helps create.
24 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 (1977).
25 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. §§ 1501-1529 (1977).
H See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3 (1977).
See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 (1977).
2' One commentator considers these functions to be the universal functions of the nuclear
family. MURDOCK, supra note 20, at 1-22. Another commentator has offered a more specific
list of the functions of marriage:
1. To establish the legal father of a woman's children.
2. To establish the legal mother of a man's children.
3. To give the husband a monopoly in the wife's sexuality.
4. To give the wife a monopoly in the husband's sexuality.
5. To give the husband partial or monopolistic rights to the wife's domestic and
other labour services.
6. To give the wife partial or monopolistic rights to the husband's labour services.
7. To give the husband partial or total rights over property belonging or potentially
accruing to the wife.
8. To give the wife partial or total rights over property belonging or potentially ac-
cruing to the husband.
9. To establish a joint fund of property - a partnership - for the benefit of the
children of the marriage.
10. To establish a socially significant 'relationship of affinity' between the husband
and his wife's brothers.
Leach, Polyandry, Inheritance and the Definition of Marriage, 54 MAN 182 (1955), reprinted
in MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND RESIDENCE, supra note 20, at 76.
2 Supra note 20. Even incest, a universal taboo, occasionally provided the basis for a pre-
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marriage.30 The Nayars practiced a form of group marriage,3' and polyan-
drous polygamy was characteristic of the Todas. 31 While these seem to be
extreme examples of divergence from the American concept, polygamy
has been the form of marriage practiced by the largest number of human
societies. 3 The extended family consisting of persons related in various
ways, 3 is universally quite common, yet rarely seen in the United States.
The American might experience great difficulty in accepting-let alone
appreciating-these alien systems of kinship. The temptation to view
one's own basic notions as the ideal or universal is almost irresistable, and
kin and family are such basic notions. The nature of our world and our
sense of human dignity, however, demands that the validity of these for-
eign systems be respected.
It can be seen that even the most basic of human institutions can
vary widely so as to be adaptive to the needs of the adopting society. If an
institution as basic as the family is subject to such diversity, then so too
will be the legal manifestations of a society. Basic cultural differences un-
derscore the need for legislatures to interpret, according to their own cul-
tural systems, the guidelines contained in the Declaration of the Rights of
the Child. To give concrete form to these guidelines in a. uniform way
across different cultures is nearly impossible. To do so would invite cul-
tural dominance by one system or another. It is far better to grant a kind
of comity to the different systems.
It appears that a national interpretation of the ten principles can well
be in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Declaration. For perhaps
the best example, education, the Declaration states that "the child is en-
titled to receive . . . an education which will promote his general culture,
and enable him, on a basis of equal opportunity, to develop his abilities,
his individual judgment, and his sense of moral and social responsibility,
and to become a useful member of society."35 It should not be difficult for
a country to agree to provide such an education.
Courts in the United States have shown a sensitivity to the cultural-
educational needs of certain minority groups. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 37
ferred form of marriage, but only in sharply circumscribed circumstances. MURDOCK, supra
note 20, at 12-13.
30 EVANS-PRrrCHARD, KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE AMONG THE NUER 108-109, discussed in Gough,
The Nayers and the Definition of Marriage, 89 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 23 (1959),
reprinted in MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND RESIDENCE, supra note 20, at 49.
31 Id.
11 Leach, supra note 28, at 75.
" Id. See also MURDOCK, supra note 20, at 23-40.
Supra note 22. The relationship can be computed bilaterally, as would be done in the
United States, or unilaterally, through either the paternal kin or the maternal kin
exclusively.
" Rights of the Child, supra note 1, Principle 7, at 20 (emphasis added).
3 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), where the Supreme Court held that the failure to
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the United States Supreme Court provided an illustration of cultural ac-
commodation which superceded the fundamental prescriptions of a legal
system. It is common in America for the individual states to impose com-
pulsory school attendance through at least a portion of secondary educa-
tion.3 In Yoder, the Supreme Court held that to require such attendance
of Amish children, whose religion opposed high school education, would
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment. 39 The State of
Wisconsin, in enacting the education law, was concerned with the mental
and physical health of its school children." The needs of the Amish com-
munity, in contrast, foreclosed extensive formal education in favor of in-
formal training in their way of life of manual farm labor in rural seclu-
sion.4 The Amish religion, at its core, prohibited high school attendance.42
The Court's holding was supported by expert testimony which empha-
sized the danger of psychological damage to Amish children due to con-
flicts between the Amish religious community and American secular soci-
ety, with such a clash eventually resulting in the obliteration of the Old
Order Amish church community. Further testimony elicited indicated
that the Amish preparation of their high school children allowed for
"learning through doing the skills directly relevant to their adult roles in
''43the Amish community ....
The Amish way of life is obviously at variance with the typical Amer-
ican mode, and its emphasis on formal education." Yet the Supreme
Court upheld the right of the Amish to pursue their peculiar form of edu-
cation in accordance with their religious beliefs. It was not the American
tolerance for cultural pluralism that led the Court to this conclusion.
Rather, it was the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious exer-
cise. 45 A cultural conflict permitting an exemption from enforcement of a
provide English language instruction to Chinese-speaking students of public schools violated
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); Mesch, Bilingual Education: A Privilege
or Right? An Illinois Report, 24 DEPAuL L. REV. 990 (1975). See also text accompanying
notes 38-46 infra.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1977).
" 406 U.S. at 213-15. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States pro-
vides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
406 U.S. 213-15.
Id. at 215.
12 Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 212.
" American emphasis on education is evidenced by the fact that the average adult .com-
pletes a median of 12.3 years of school. THE CBS NEWS ALMANAC 765 (S. Westerman & M.A.
Bacheller eds. 1977). See also INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 745 (A. Goldenpaul ed. 1976).
11 Supra note 39.
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
state statute would not be countenanced by the Supreme Court if it were
merely based on ideology. The Yoder Court required a demonstration of
"the sincerity of [the Amish] religious beliefs [and] the interrelationship
of belief with their mode of life [as well as] the adequacy of their alterna-
tive mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of pre-
cisely those overall interests that the State advances in support of its pro-
gram of compulsory high school education.""
The Yoder decision is an illustration of how a nation's cultural differ-
ences can be accommodated according to the constitutional (and cul-
tural) principles of the country. Since Yoder, the right of legitimate relig-
ious groups to pursue their culturally unorthodox practices is now viewed
in American law as more fundamental than the right of the state to insist
upon higher education. To be sure, Yoder analogies can be made in the
international context. If the Supreme Court had found itself bound by the
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, it would have been simple to up-
hold the peculiar education promoting the general culture of the Amish
children. Such an unusual kind of training is different from, yet as valid
as, the required secular education. The Constitution, with its incorpora-
tion of the. Declaration's principles,'7 provided the Yoder Court with an
406 U.S. at 235.
Query whether international conventions actually cause nations to incorporate fundamen-
tal principles or agreed-upon principles into municipal law, or whether the principles mon
significant in municipal law are simply restated in international agreements. See e.g., Fried-
mann, The Role of International Law in the Conduct of International Affairs, 20 INT'L J. 158
(1965). Friedmann provides examples of the supremacy of national policies over interna-
tional law. The author, however, maintains that "the meaning of 'national interest' . ..
today includes universally binding rules against aggression as an aspect of national sur-
vival." Id. at 17. It is nonetheless clear that not all nations view their national interests in
that light. See also 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW xii (M.C. Bassiouni & V.
Nanda eds. 1973). The major obstacles to the effective establishment of public international
law are "the adamant refusal of nation-states to surrender or share their power with an
international orgainization . . . [and] the apparent impossibility of nation-states to agree
on common goals .... " Id. See also Schwarzenberger, Sovereignty: Ideology and Reality, 4
Y.B. INT'L AFFAIRS 1 (1950).
There are those who dismiss the idea of international law as hopelessly theoretical and
question its legitimacy due to the lack of sanctions. One commentator retorts that interna-
tional law does have means for securing its observance, but the sanctions, not being central-
ized, "are precarious in their operation." J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 101 (6th ed.
Waldock 1963). Those who accept the existence of international law generally fall into two
camps. According to the monist view, "law" is a discrete, unitary entity, and international
law occupies a higher strata than does municipal law. In contrast, the dualist perspective
maintains that international law and national law constitute two separate and distinct sys-
tems. See generally, McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A
Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S.D. L. Rav. 25 (1959); Sinha, The Position of the Individual
in an International Criminal Law, in A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CmMrNAL LAW xii, at 122,
130 (M.C. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973).
One researcher undertook an anthropological attempt at understanding international
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acceptable solution.
Just as Yoder refined America's concept of fundamental values, so
might another nation, by implementing the principles contained in the
Declaration, find itself voluntarily transforming its concepts of fundamen-
tal rights. This would be the preferred-and the most effective-method
of transmission or modification of cultural values. International law's reli-
ance upon "higher principles" of public order creates a basic tension be-
tween cultural pluralism and those "higher principles." How are those
higher principles to be discovered and applied? How do we go about iden-
tifying life's most fundamental values? How are these values to be
achieved? Is such a search inherently ethnocentric? Does cultural relativ-
ism lead to moral nihilism?"8 We must turn to these crucial questions,
retaining both a thirst for truth and a humility in our ability to ade-
quately recognize fundamental values.
Having indicated my theoretical biases, and having acknowledged my
limitations, I will make two limited proposals as to what an international
body of Catholic jurists can do to further real recognition of the rights of
children.' 9 On the municipal level, Catholic lawyers must attempt to
eliminate all distinctions based on the status of bastardy. On the transna-
tional level, agreement on the recognition of foreign adoption decrees
must be achieved. Each of these proposals will be discussed in turn.
law. Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AimmcAN ANTRuOPOLOGIST 33 (1965).
Bohannan posited that "it is the essence of 'law' to present a double institutionalization of
norms." Id. at 37. Bohannan proffered that norms of a society or community must be resin-
stitutionalized within a legal institution to constitute law. In his view, law need not be asso-
ciated with a unicentric power system. International law, representing a multicentric and
multicultural system, can be effective only in its compatibility with the cultural norms of
the world community. Bohannan noted that international law requires not mere double in-
stitutionalization but treble institutionalization: "once at the level of custom, once at the
level of the legal institutions of states, and again at the level of bicentric; bicultural 'interna-
tional' accord." Id. at 41. This version of international law seems to stand somewhere be-
tween the monist and dualist view. Bohannan discusses the definition of international law
and questions its existence, finding that "[T]he most sophisticated scholars ... have been
driven to realize that, in relation to a noetic unity like law, which is not represented by
anything except man's ideas about it, definition can mean no more than a set of mnemonics
to remind the reader what has been talked about." Id. at 33. It is submitted that functional
explanations are more useful than mere definition.
41 I would like to argue that cultural relativism does not presume the absence of universal
moral norms. However, that argument is beyond the scope of this paper.
,1 A basic tenet of Catholicism is that children deserve special care and concern. See gener-
ally Pius XII, Aid to Youth in the World Crisis (Encyclical Letter), 44 CATHOLIC MIND 129
(1946); see also Pius XII, The Christian Education of Youth (Divine Illus Magistri), re-
printed in R. FULLAM, S.J., THE POPES ON YourT 5 (1956).
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MUNICIPAL LAW:
THE ELIMINATION OF BASTARDY DISTINCTIONS
I submit that distinctions on the basis of bastardy are inherently evil
and violative of fundamental human rights, regardless Df the cultural con-
text in which the distinctions emerge. Even where there is a deeply held
cultural belief that the status of illegitimacy places the illegitimate child
in a position socially and legally inferior to that of the legitimate child,
these beliefs must surrender to a higher principle. This particular princi-
ple, contained in the Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of
the Rights of the Child, mandates that the child shall be free from dis-
crimination based on birth status. 0 The child has the basic right to be
free from all social and legal distinctions based upon its status at birth. It
is inherently obnoxious to penalize a child for circumstances over which it
had no control, especially the child's conception. It is sheer vindictiveness
to burden a child with the sins of the parents.
The rationale for distinctions based upon illegitimacy centers upon
protection of the institution of the family. 5 This is a tenuous proposition.
Laws that prevent an illegitimate from inheriting or claiming the support
of paternal kin protect only those paternal kin and clearly do not protect
the illegitimate and its mother, who do constitute a form of family.2 If the
fathers who beget children with mindless abandon are deemed to owe the
out-of-wedlock child the same duties as those born in wedlock, then care-
less procreation would be severely discouraged. It is true that bastardy
disabilities protect the wife and children of an errant husband from the
claims of his illegitimate child. However, the innocent child who had the
misfortune of existence via an illicit union should not suffer. This inno-
cent child has the right to and the need for physical and emotional sup-
port from both its parents.
Notwithstanding the recent public outcry for recognition of the rights
of the illegitimate, bastardy distinctions remain pervasive.53 The United
States Supreme Court in recent years has recognized that discrimination
on the basis of illegitimate status is invidious and barred by the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.5 The illegitimate child, however,
still does not have equal claims upon the father." Our immigration policy
presents a striking example of existing bastardy disabilities. An American
Rights of the Child, supra note 1, Principles 1, 3, 6. See also Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 1, arts. 11 & 22.
"1 See, e.g., Horgan, The Financial Support of Illegitimate Children, 11 IR. JUmsT 59 (1976);
Staines, The Concept of "The Family" under the Irish Constitution, 11 IR. JuRIsT 223 (1976).
52 Id.
See also text accompanying notes 56-60 infra.
' Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
See generally, Kim & Fox, The Legal Status of Amerasian Children in Japan: A Study in
the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35 (1978).
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woman's illegitimate alien child may gain preferred immigrant status by
virtue of being the Act's definition of "child,"" while an alien mother may
gain preferred immigrant status by virtue of being the "parent" of an
American illegitimate child.5 7 These preferences do not extend to the rela-
tionship between the illegitimate child and the father. 58 In Fiallo v. Bell,5
the Supreme Court held that such a distinction was a valid exercise of
Congress' power over immigration, in light of the "problems of identifica-
tion, administration, and the potential for fraud.""
To eradicate incidents of discrimination due to bastardy, all children
must be deemed legitimate. The pursuit of this particular course is hin-
dered by the difficulty of establishing paternity. With present medical
technology it is usually impossible to determine paternity with certainty.
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that there can be - and in many soci-
eties is - a distinction between biological paternity and legal or social
paternity," and while the rights of a putative father are not to be unduly
minimized, the primacy of the illegitimate child's requirements of physi-
cal and emotional nourishment must be assured.
At least two steps can be taken to resolve the problems of bastardy
distinctions. One is the rather obvious but amorphous step of pursuing all
available avenues to eradicate the consequences to the child of distinc-
tions based on the sexual conduct of the parents. Additionally, a more
concrete step is for attorneys to seek the advice of geneticists on the state
of the art of establishing paternity. An international multi-disciplinary at-
tack on the problem should be made by jurists, behavioral scientists, and
geneticists with the legal, social, and biological ramifications of eliminat-
ing bastardy distinctions seriously studied."
.! 8 U.S.C..§ 1100 et. seq. (1976).
Id. at § 1101(b)(1)(D).
Id. at § 1101(b)(2).
430 U.S. 787, 789 (1977).
60 Id.
1.1 Id. at 795 n.6.
12 See, e.g., Leach, supra note 28. The need for consultation among real experts is shown by
this stinging comment:
A recent reprint from the Family Law Quarterly entitled Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines:
Present Status of Serological Testing in Problems of Disputed Paternity was gratui-
tously circulated recently to many general pathologists, serologists and lawyers. Al-
though it is specifically stated in the preface that there are limitations to the current
state of capabilities, the report, nevertheless, goes on to include more than the accept-
able and proven blood group tests, those involving HLA systems, serum protein sys-
tems, and erythrocyte enzyme systems.
The response of less-than-expert individuals such as general pathologists, lawyers
and even litigants to this pamphlet has led to a rash of consultations and requests for
these tests, demonstrating the confusion and lack of understanding that has been
created.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW: RECOGNITION
OF FOREIGN ADOPrION DECREES
Nations of the world should be guided by the principles contained in
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in honestly and earnestly striv-
ing to protect and nourish their children. As noted, the most appropriate
source of legislation will be municipal law, but where the rights of the
child have transnational aspects and implications, multilateral arrange-
ments are necessary. Few of our responsibilities to children are truly inter-
national, with significant exceptions such as traffic in children, 3 immigra-
tion, 4 nationality of children of parents of mixed nationality, 5 and
intercountry adoptions.66 It is submitted that there is a need for an inter-
To complicate the problem, the pamphlet itself has several typographical errors,
omissions and half-truths ....
Sussman, Letters to the Editor, 67 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 649, 649 (1978). On paternity
testing, see, e.g., Beautyman, Paternity Actions - A Matter of Opinion or a Trial of the
Blood?, 1976 LEGAL MED. ANN. 239 (1977); Chakraborty & Schull, A Note on the Distribu-
tion of the Number of Exclusions to be Expected in Paternity Testing, 28 AM. J. HUMAN
GENETICS 615 (1976); Dissing & Svensmark, Human Red Cell Acid Phosphatase: Quantita-
tive Evidence of a Silent Gene PO, and a Danish Population Study, 26 HUMAN HEREDITY 43
(1976); Drykes & Polesky, The Usefulness of Serum Protein and Erythrocyte Enzyme
Polymorphisms in Paternity Testing, 65 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 982 (1976); Langaney &
Pison, Probability of Paternity: Useless, 27 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 558 (1975); Lapinski et
al, Use of Microplate Methods in Paternity Testing, 70 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 766
(1978); Marcinkowski, Marcinkowski & Krzymanska, Chances for Exclusion of Fatherhood
of Defendant Non-Fathers Concerning Twins of Compatible and Incompatible Serological
Structure, 6 FOR. ScI. 125 (1975); Nakagome et al, Pitfalls in the Use of Chromosone Vari-
ants for Paternity Dispute Cases, 37 HUMAN GENETICS 255 (1977); Olaisen, Application of the
GPT System in Paternity Cases, 25 HUMAN HEREDITY 204 (1975); Poleski & Krause, Blood
Typing in Disputed Paternity Cases: Capabilities of American Laboratories, 17 TRANSFUSION
521 (1977); Salmon & Brocteur, Probability of Paternity, 28 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 622
(1976); Schacter, Hsu, & Bias, HLA and Other Genetic Markers in Disputed Paternity: A
Report of 50 Cases, 9 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 233 (1977); Terasaki et al, Twins with
Two Different Fathers Identified by HLA, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 590 (1978); Valentin, Sta-
tistical Evidence in Paternity Cases: Imperative, 28 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 620 (1976).
63 See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation
of the Prostitution of Others, G.A. Res. 317, U.N. Doc. A/1251 (1949), reprinted in Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1.
6 See, e.g., Kane & Velarde-Munoz, Undocumented Aliens and the Constitution: Limita-
tions on State Action Denying Undocumented Children Access to Public Education, 5 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 461 (1978); Schmidt, Immigration Benefits for Children Born Out of Wed-
lock and for Their Natural Fathers: A Survey of the Law, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 11 (1978).
See also, Lehman, Children of Undocumented Win Right to Schooling In New York, 8 IMMI-
GRATION NEWSLETTER 19 (1979); Deportation of Aliens - Deportation of Alien Parents Re-
sulting in De Facto Deportation of Their Citizen Child is Precluded by the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 322 (1977).
65 Kim & Fox, The Legal Status of Amerasian Children in Japan: A Study in the Conflict of
Nationality Laws, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35 (1978).
6 See generally, Beckenridge, Non-Recognition of Foreign Abandonment Decrees in United
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national instrument on the recognition of foreign adoption decrees. The
theory that the interests of the adopted child are well-served by the sta-
bility implicit in such an agreement will be developed below. 7
In 1964, the Hague Conference on Private International Law drafted
a Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees
Relating to Adoption."5 A relatively unsuccessful convention,69 it expressly
applied only to transnational adoptions. Thus, in instances where the
child has a different nationality or habitual residence than the adopting
parent(s)70 jurisdiction vests in the country of the adopting parent(s)' na-
tionality or habitual residence.7 The choice of law rule is the lex fori."1
Where jurisdiction is by virtue of habitual residence, however, the law of
the nationality of the adopting parent or parents shall apply as to the
impediments to adoption," and the law of the adopted child's nationality
shall apply as consent to the child's adoption.7' The forum state is to initi-
ate an inquiry into the social circumstances of all parties, the best interest
of the child being the paramount goal." Adoptions granted pursuant to
the dictates of the Convention "shall be recognized without further for-
States Adoption Proceedings, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 137 (1977); Eddleman, Immigration and
Adoption of Operation Babylife Orphans: Tough Decisions in Family Law, 4 ORANGE COUNTY
B.J. 164 (1977); Jayme, Florida Spouses Adopt Italian Child in Germany: Multistate Adop-
tion and Doctrine of "Hidden Renvoi," 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 290 (1969); International Adoption
- United States Adoption of Vietnamese Children: Vital Consideration for the Courts, 52
DEN. L.J. 771 (1975); Comment, Law and Procedure in Intercountry Adoptions by California
Residents, 8 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REv. 241 (1975); Comment, Immigration Laws, Procedures and
Impediments Pertaining to Intercountry Adoptions, 4 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 257 (1974).
"7 See text accompanying notes 82-104 infra.
" Reprinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MATTERs 339 (1965); 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 558 (1965) [herein-
after cited as Hague Adoption Convention].
" Blom, The Adoption Act of 1968, and the Conflict of Laws, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 109, 110
(1973).
70 Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 68, art. 2. The Convention does not apply, "for
reasons of technical difficulty," where the adopting parents do not share the same national-
ity. Comment, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
1964-1965 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 224, 225 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Hague Conference].
" Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 68, art. 3. The term "habitual residence" was
used since it is not as susceptible to varying legal interpretations as "domicile," while never-
theless a means of asserting jurisdiction over children residing with parents abroad. Addi-
tionally, since its determination is purely factual its resolution cannot be reviewed by the
courts of other countries. 1964 Hague Conference, supra note 70, at 226. See also Glick,
Adoption in the Conflict of Laws: Australia Joins the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law, 49 AUSTL. L.J. 181 (1975). Glick argues that using habitual residence as a basis
of jurisdiction fetters the discretion to protect the child. Id. at 185.
72 Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 68, art. 4.
13 Id. The Hague Adoption Convention requires that impediments be formally declared by
the signatories. Id. at arts. 4 & 13.
7, Id. at art. 5.
7' Id. at art. 6.
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mality in all contracting States."7 All contracting states are to be bound
by the findings of fact on which a State bases its jurisdiction.77
Impediments to adoption listed in the Convention expressly recog-
nize cultural diversity.78 Accordingly, the internal law of a contracting
State may prohibit adoption. This clause was a compromise between
those nations which consider impediments to adoption to be inherently
obnoxious, and those which consider the impediments to be very
important. 9
Additionally, the Convention contains an equitable provision permit-
ting broad discretionary action. The Convention may be disregarded when
its observance "would be manifestly contrary to public policy."" The
Convention is an excellent work and should be reconsidered by those na-
tions not adopting it. However, it does need some modification, as will be
discussed below.81
To the extent possible in a multicultural world, international consid-
eration of transnational adoptions must place foremost emphasis on the
best interests of the child. It is difficult enough to discover what is in the
best interests of the child in a single culture.82 For example, a great
11 Id. at art. 8.
17 Id.
71 Art. 13 provides in part:
Any State may . . . make a declaration specifying the provisions of its internal
law prohibiting adoptions founded upon -
(a) the existence of descendents of the adopter or adopters;
(b) the fact that a single person is applying to adopt;
(c) the existence of a blood relationship between an adopter and the child;
(d) the existence of a previous adoption of the child by other persons;
(e) the requirement of a difference in age between adopter or adopters and the
child;
(f) the age of the adopter or adopters and that of the child;
(g) the fact that the child does not reside with the adopter or adopters.
7, 1964 Hague Conference, supra note 70, at 227.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 68, art. 15. The question of whether this clause
could be legitimately used by a forum state whose citizen father lost his rights to his ac-
knowledged child because of a foreign abandonment decree, arose before a Tennessee state
court. Taylor v. McElroy, 522 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1024 (1975). The
American father of a Korean child, whose mother he married sometime after the child's
birth, intervened in a proceeding by an American couple to adopt the child. 522 S.W.2d at
346-47. According to Korean law, the child had been adandoned. Id. at 347-48. The Tennes-
see court refused to be bound by the foreign decree. Id. at 348-49; see Breckenridge, Non-
Recognition of Foreign Abandonment Decrees in United States Adoption Proceedings, 18
HARv. INT'L L.J. 137 (1977).
1' See text accompanying note 109 infra.
12 Comment, The Best Interests of the Child - The Illinois Adoption Act in Perspective, 24
DE PAUL L. REV. 100 (1974). For American research on child development, see E. ERIKSON,
CHILDHOOD AND SociErY (1964); P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER & J. KAGAN, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND
PERSONALITY (1974); Thomas et at, Individuality in Responses of Children to Similar Envi-
ronmental Situations, 117 AM. J. PsYcH. 798 (1961).
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amount of research by American and British scholars concerning the
needs of the child and the effects of adoption" yields contradictory find-
ings on determining the child's needs and on the effect of adoption. How-
ever, there are definite indications in the psychiatric literature', that chil-
dren who are adopted are more prone to emotional disturbances than are
non-adopted children. The Schecter study maintained that adopted chil-
dren are thirteen times more likely to be referred to psychiatrists than are
non-adopted.85 The Goodman report criticized the original Schecter study
for failing to account for differences in geography and income . 8 Since it is
primarily the middle and upper classes who adopt formally through the
legal system, it is to be expected that adopted children would be over-
represented in a psychiatrist's private practice. Goodman found that 1.7%
of the American population was extrafamilially adopted, that is, adopted
by nonrelatives. The Goodman research was conducted from 1956 through
1962 at the Staten Island Health Center, where it was found that 2.4% of
those patients were extrafamilially adopted. According to the Goodman
study the adopted were almost twice as likely to seek psychiatric care.
While Goodman believed that this difference was significant, it is less
There is a wealth of literature on the deleterious effects of maternal deprivation, pater-
nal separation, and the adoption process. The information on parental separation is not di-
rectly applicable to the problems of adoption as these studies generally deal with the effects
of hospitalization and parental death. However, such studies are suggestive of the child's
needs. For parental separation, see, e.g., Ainsworth et al, The Effects of Maternal Depriva-
tion: A Review of Findings and Controversy in the Context of Research Strategy, reprinted
in DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE, PUBuC HEALTH PAPERS No. 14, Geneva: World Health
Organization 97 (1962); Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health, Monograph Series No.
2, Geneva: World Health Organization (1951); Bowlby, The Nature of the Child's Tie to His
Mother, 39 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 350 (1958); Bowlby, Separation Anxiety: A Critical
Review of the Literature, 1 J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCH. 251 (1960); Bowlby et al, The Effects
of Mother-Child Separation: A Follow-Up Study 20 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCH. 211 (1956);
Humphrey et al, Adoptive Families Referred For Psychiatric Advice, 110 BrT. J. PSYCH. 549
(1964); Mead, A Cultural Anthropologist's Approach to Maternal Deprivation, reprinted in
DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE, PUBLIC HEALTH PAPER No. 14, Geneva: World Health Organ-
ization 45 (1962); Schaffer, Objective Observations on Personality Development in Early In-
fancy, 31 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCH. 174 (1958); Spitz, Hospitalism, 1 PSYCHOANALYTICAL STUDY OF
THE CHILD 313 (1946). On the effects of adoption, see, e.g., Bohman, A Comparative Study of
Adopted Children, Foster Children and Children in Their Biological Environment Born Af-
ter Undesired Pregnancies, 221 SUPPLEMENT ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVIA 1 (1971); Jack-
son, Unsuccessful Adoptions: A Study of 40 Cases Who Attended a Child Guidance Clinic,
41 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCH. 389 (1968); Mikawa & Boston, Psychological Characteristics of
Adopted Children, 42 SUPP. PSYCH. Q. 274 (1968).
See notes 84-101 infra.
1 The author's review of the literature focused solely on research that is expressly empirical,
a theoretical bias which is a recognition of the fragile nature of psychiatric thought.
Schechter, Observations on Adopted Children, 3 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 21, 21 (1960).
Goodman, Silberstein & Mandell, Adopted Children Brought to Child Psychiatric Clinic,
9 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 451, 451 (1963).
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alarming than earlier studies show.87 Other researchers generally found a
greater percentage of adopted children in psychiatric settings than did
Goodman, but the figures are also lower than Schecter's original 1 3 .3%.1
There is some evidence that the avoidance of emotional disturbances
varies with the age of the child at placement and with the type of place-
ment. However, the research and findings in this area are inconclusive
and contradictory. One researcher found that children adopted after the
age of 6 months are more likely to later evidence psychiatric distur-
bances."9 The results of another study indicated that children adopted af-
ter the age of 6 years fared no worse than those adopted in infancy." It is
particularly striking that the older children in the latter study had been
placed in several foster homes prior to adoption. The number of such fos-
ter home placements averaged 2.3, and in all cases court action had ter-
minated parental rights.91
It is generally unquestioned that institutionalization of the child is
the least desirable alternative and that even poor parenting is preferable."
,7 See note 85 supra.
u Other studies of the incidence of adopted children found in psychiatric settings include
Bohman, A Comparative Study of Adopted Children, Foster Children and Children in Their
Biological Environment Born After Undesired Pregnancies, 221 SUPPLEMENT ACTA PAEDIA-
TRICA SCANDINAVIA 1 (1971); Humphrey et al, Adoptive Families Referred for Psychiatric Ad-
vice, 109 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 599 (1963); Jackson, Unsuccessful Adoptions: A Study of 40 Cases
Who Attended a Child Guidance Clinic, 41 Barr. J. MED. PSYCH. 389 (1968); Jameson, Psy-
chiatric Disorders in Adopted Children in Texas, 63 TEx. MED. 83 (1967); Kirk et al, Are
Adopted Children Especially Vulnerable to Stress?, 14 ARcHivEs GENERAL PSYCH. 291 (1966);
Lawton & Gross, Review of Psychiatric Literature on Adopted Children, 11 ARCHIVES GEN-
ERAL PSYCH. 635 (1964); Mikawa & Boston, Psychological Characteristics of Adopted Chil-
dren, 42 SuPP. PSYCH. Q. 274 (1968); Offord et al, Presenting Symptomatology of Adopted
Children, 20 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 110 (1969); Schechter et al, Emotional Problems of
the Adoptee, 10 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 109 (1964); Simon et al, Adoption and Psychiatric
Illness, 122 Supp. AM. J. PSYCH. 858 (1966).
89 See, e.g., Bell, Special Considerations in the Adoption of the Older Child, 40 Soc.
CASEWORK 327 (1959); Brieland, Current Research on Adoption, 30 Soc. SERVICE REV. 247
(1956); Humphrey et al, Adoptive Families Referred for Psychiatric Advice, 109 BRIT. J.
PSYCH. 549 (1964); Offord et al, Presenting Symptomatology of Adopted Children, 20
ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 110 (1969); Ripple, A Follow-Up Study of Adopted Children, 40
SOC. SERVICE REV. 479 (1968); Schaffer, Objective Observations of Personality Development
in Early Infancy, 31 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCH. 174 (1958).
" Kadushin, A Follow-Up Study of Children Adopted When Older: Criteria of Success, 37
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHOLOGY 530, 538 (1967).
' Id. at 532.
'2 Brieland, Current Research on Adoption, 30 Soc. SERvicE REV. 247 (1956); Spitz, Hospital-
ism, 1 PSYCHOANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE CHILD 53 (1945). The desirability of any system of
parenting depends upon the qualities that are desired in a particular culture. Multiple
mothering or institutional parenting is not per se unhealthy. B. BErrELHEIM, CHILDREN OF
THE DREAM (1969); Mead, A Cultural Anthropologist's Approach to Material Deprivation,
reprinted in DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE, PuBLIC HEALTm PAPER No. 14, Geneva: World
Health Organization 45 (1962). See also J. GOODY, DEATH, PROPERTY AND THE ANCESTORS, at
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While psychopathology and affectionless behavior are often associated
with institutionalization and severb parental deprivation, some children
nonetheless have displayed a surprising degree of resiliency. 3 In any
event, it cannot be said with certainty that severe deprivation, whether
caused by institutionalization, foster care, or poor parenting, commonly
causes psychopathy or affectionless behavior.9
The evidence that adoption itself presents special problems for the
child can be partially explained by the child's reaction to the loss of the
natural parents and by the adopting parents' reaction to the child. Ini-
tially, the child feels rejected from the natural parents and it appears to
be immaterial that the decision of the biological mother to relinquish the
child was made for altruistic reasons. Evidence of other similarly situated
parents who have kept their children serves to substantiate the child's
sense of abandonment. Even in cases of death or institutionalization of
the parent, the child may experience feelings of rejection. 5 Additionally,
the child may feel that he or she is a second choice for the adoptive par-
ents, since the decision to adopt in most instances stems from reproduc-
tive difficulty." Therefore, adoption is second to the choice of procreation.
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for adoptive parents to blame the
child's behavioral problems on heredity. 7 Such an attitude could easily
place stress on the parent-child relationship, emphasizing the natural sep-
arateness of the adopted child."
What emerges from American and British adoption studies is that it
is difficult to conclude, even within one or two cultural contexts, just what
the adopted child needs. While American adoption laws commonly call
379-415 (1972); Goody, Adoption in Cross-Cultural Perspective, 11 COMP. STUD. Soc. & Hsr.
5(1969).
Bowlby et al, The Effects of Mother-Child Separation: A Follow-Up Study, 20 BRIT. J.
MED. PSYCH. 211 (1956); Williams, Some Effects of Institutional Living on Personality Devel-
opment, 28 J. MAiR. & FAM. 331, 336 (1966).
" Bowlby, supra note 93.
" That children view death as a rejection of the child by the deceased is a common psycho-
analytic interpretation. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD & A. SOLINT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
" A common assumption is that infertile couples are more likely to adopt. See, e.g., Kirk,
Dilemma of Adoptive Parenthood: Incongruous Role Obligations, 21 MAR. & FAM. LIVING
316 (1959); Kadushin, Study of Adoptive Parents of Hard-to-Place Children, 43 Soc.
CASEWORK 227, 229 (1962). Concern over the population explosion may also lead couples to
seek adoption.
"7 See Schechter et al, Emotional Problems of the Adoptee, 10 ARCHIvEs GENERAL PSYCH. 109,
110 (1964); Walsh & Lewis, Study of Adoptive Mothers in a Child Guidance Clinic, 50 Soc.
CASEWORK 587, 587 (1969).
" See generally D. KIRK, SHARm FATE: A THEORY OF ADOPTION AND MENTAL HEALTH (1964).
Kirk analyzes the problems that occur when both adopter and adoptee try to believe that
they are 6 natural, biological family.
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for "the best interests of the child" to be served," it is not particularly
clear what truly are the "best interests." One study contended that the
term itself is an exercise in authoritarian delusion.' °" The report noted
that adoption and custody situations are inherently detrimental to the
child and that a more appropriate standard would be "the least detrimen-
tal available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and develop-
ment." Emphasizing the need of the child for relative permanence and
stability in the familial relationship, the authors argued that a child
should rarely be separated from a family - of whatever kind or form -
with which the child had established a continuing relationship. 0'
It is reasonable, logical, and probably in the best interests of children
to apply this theory in the international sphere. The child's need for sta-
bility and the differing cultural contexts defining family values, are strong
factors for permitting foreign adoption decrees to have effect in all na-
tions. This is particularly so where the foreign adoption was made in the
best interests of the child, as that best interest is interpreted in that na-
tion's cultural context.
I wish it were enough to state that the best interests of the child will
be served by international agreement to give final effect to all foreign
adoption decrees and that nations would be compelled by higher princi-
ples, by fundamental values, or by public order to implement this need.
As a practical and legal matter, however, it will not be nearly enough.
The practical matter is an issue of power politics and parochialism, which
must give way to the needs of the world's children, and that should be of
little political significance. Legal theories will intrude if we attempt to
resolve the problem by an international treaty or convention. One ques-
tion that will arise, at least in federalist nations, will be the treaty power
of the federal government over matters of family law.'"' However, since
the question of transnational adoptions is clearly a matter of international
concern, the treaty power of federal governments should be exercisable.1 0 3
" See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. § 1525 (1977). It is not uncommon for the adoption laws to
express concern for the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Basic Principles of Legislation in
the USSR And Union Republics on Marriage and the Family, § 3, art. 24 (1968), cited in
Stone, The New Fundamental Principles of Soviet Family Law and Their Social Back-
ground, 18 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 392 (1969). But see Kim, Legislative Tendency of Adoption
in the Developing Country, reprinted in THE CMLD AND THE LAW 325 (F. Bates ed. 1976).
11 GoLDsTEN, FREUD & SoLNrr, supra note 95. The major problem with the Goldstein, Freud
& Solnit study, albeit an important effort by a lawyer and two child psychiatrists, is that it
explains little of the empirical or clinical facts on which the guidelines are based.
101 Id. at 53-65, 71-105.
' See Curtis, The Treaty Power and Family Law, 7 GA. L. Rev. 55 (1972).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 117 (1965)
which provides in part:
(1) The United States has the power under the Constitution to make an international
agreement if
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Even if it were argued that a United States treaty concerning adoption
would contravene the rights of the several states, there is evidence that
the principles of a resulting adoption treaty would be in conformity with
the existing laws of the several states. The laws of the several states typi-
cally declare that the paramount concern in adoption proceedings is the
best interests of the child. The international agreement will be in further-
ance of the child's best interests: in its recognition of foreign decrees,
thereby emphasizing the stability of established family relationships; and
in its tying to a foreign law of adoption, presumably giving its own inter-
pretation to "the best interests of the child." The United States could
conceivably ratify the Convention with the understanding that the ratifi-
cation is a recognition of the rights of the respective states over matters of
family law.'04 Decisions of foreign courts in matters of child custody have
received recognition by at least one state court. In In re Lang,'0 5 the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, confronted an international kid-
napping-custody situation. Justice Breitel, writing for a unanimous court,
sought a general solution to the problem of conflict in custody laws. Under
the traditional approach, the forum court would reopen the foreign deci-
sion and question the custody decision anew.'"' By so doing, the ultimate
custody decision is based on the court's interpretation of the best interests
of the child. Justice Breitel sought a more general rule of deference to the
original foreign custody decree, and he based this deference both on re-
spect for the ajudication of the matter by the foreign tribunal and the
welfare of the child. Justice Breitel observed that "even in child custody
matters there is no reason to doubt that the law, if it is to be law and not
some uncontrolled discretion, necessarily functions rationally through the
application of general principles."' 0 The result in Lang is aligned with
one commentator's view that "[aidherence to the prior decree . . . ac-
(a) the matter is of international concern, and
(b) the agreement does not contravene any of the limitations of the Constitu-
tion applicable to all powers of the United States.
See also Mosler, The Protection of Human Rights by International Legal Procedures, 52
GEO. L.J. 800 (1964).
101 This is precisely what was done by the United States in ratifying the United Nations
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of
Marriages:
In view of our Constitutional system my government, in considering ratification of the
Convention, will do so with the understanding that the ratification . . . will be re-
garded as constituting a recognition and not an impairment of the constitutional
rights of the respective states of the United States to regulate marriages within their
jurisdictions.
U.N. Doc. A/PV 1167, at 33-35 (1962), cited in Curtis, supra note 103, at 55 n.1.
9 App. Div. 2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1959), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 1029, 166 N.E.2d 861 (1960).
,0 Bodenheimer, The International Kidnapping of Children: The United States Approach,
11 FAM. L.Q. 83, 87 (1977).
,o 9 App. Div. 2d at 408, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
cords with the child's interest in the unperturbed continuity of his estab-
lished home."' 8 While Lang concerned a custody battle between parents,
its ratio decidendi is equally applicable when giving deference to foreign
adoption decrees. Furthermore, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act incorporates the Lang principles into international custody law. 09 At-
tempts have been made to require American states to enforce sister state
custody decrebs and to recognize foreign nation custody judgments as
well." 0 Again, the same principles apply in the adoption arena. The fed-
eral government should be able to arrive at a satisfactory adoption treaty.
Problems that will surface include the treaty's impact on municipal im-
migration law and conflict of law difficulties. But some agreement must
be reached, and the Hague Convention on Adoption is a good beginning."'
Any international agreement should contain the following proviso:
The best interests of the child are given paramount consideration in the
internal law of all Contracting States. The child's need for the stability and
relative permanence in family relationships is acknowledged. It is recognized
that disruptions in continuing relationships are detrimental to the child.
The provisions of the present Convention may be disregarded in Con-
tracting States only when their observance would be manifestly contrary to
the public policy of the forum state and when the provisions would clearly
result in immediate or irreparable harm to the child.
The international agreement must have, as its continual benchmark, the
welfare of children. Although deference to the foreign decrees must be
nearly automatic, it will be necessary nonetheless to include a clause al-
lowing discretion in the forum state where technical adherence to the
Convention could result in clear abuse of the child.
" Bodenheimer, supra note 106, at 90.
Child Custody Jurisdiction, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED §§ I et seq. (1973).
u A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW § 45 (1962).
. If an international agreement fails, ethical jurists must still work for the enactment of
municipal laws that give deference to foreign adoption decrees. One possibility would be to
employ the Act of State doctrine, the principle that the courts of one nation will not judge
the validity of foreign government acts committed within that foreign government's terri-
tory. For a criticism of the application of this theory to foreign adoptions, see Breckenridge,
Non-Recognition of Foreign Abandonment Decrees in United States Proceedings, 18 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 137 (1977). Breckenridge argues that the Act of State doctrine should not be
applied to judicial proceedings, id. at 143, and that the purposes of the doctrine - to pre-
vent affronts to foreign governments and to leave the conduct of foreign affairs to the execu-
tive branch - would not be served in the adoption context. Id. at 144. Breckenridge posits
that since the forum state has jurisdiction over the conduct involved, the Act of State doc-
trine is inappropriate. Id.
